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Abstract: This conversation among the editors of ARIEL and 
Timothy Clark addresses his 2012 essay, “Derangements of Scale,” 
published in Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change. In 
his essay, Clark suggests that scale effects play an important role in 
contemporary global politics and climate change, and he proposes 
a new, larger scale of literary study commensurate with an aware-
ness of these issues. The editors discuss the implications of Clark’s 
essay for postcolonial studies, the merits of his proposed method 
of literary interpretation, and the ramifications of his discussion of 
human agency. Clark takes up all of these issues in his response to 
the editors’ conversation.
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In his recent essay “Derangements of Scale,” Timothy Clark argues that 
scale effects play an increasingly significant role in contemporary global 
politics and have important implications for literary studies. Scale ef-
fects occur when physical and social structures that might work on a 
smaller scale fail to work on a larger one: a model of a wooden bridge 
rebuilt as a full-sized bridge, for example, might fail to support the nec-
essary weight.
 The management of global climate change, Clark explains, is under-
mined by the globally dominant system of political governance, which 
is based on the nation-state and democratic individualism and thus 
occurs on the wrong scale. Founded on “institutions of private prop-
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erty, market-based economics, individualistic-rights-based notions of 
personhood and the conception of the state as ‘existing to secure the 
freedom of individuals on a formally egalitarian basis,’” the modern po-
litical system supports “the unmolested use of individual property and 
exploitation of natural resources” (Clark). The dominant contemporary 
system of political governance thus exacerbates the problems of global 
climate change and undermines attempts to address global warming. 
As these foundations of governance and liberal society are dissemi-
nated globally, scale effects have escalating consequences. Clark argues 
that “progressive social and economic policies designed to disseminate 
Western levels of prosperity . . . resemble, on another scale, an insane 
plan to destroy the biosphere.”
 The problems of contemporary political governance, Clark suggests, 
are replicated in contemporary methods of literary criticism, which also 
occur on the wrong scale. The dominant modes of criticism, including 
Marxism, feminism, postcolonial theory, queer theory, race studies, and 
disability studies, pit the rights and privileges of different groups against 
each other with the aim of achieving equity among the groups. Under 
this method, a text becomes “an arena for the contestation of individual 
or collective interests, rights or identity claims” (Clark). Yet the goal of 
such contestation—the redistribution of social and material resources 
on a more equitable basis—elides the environmental damage caused 
by the exploitation of material resources. The attempt to achieve just 
human arrangements (and to use literary texts to help us think about 
what those might be or how they might be achieved) looks ideologi-
cally suspect on the scale of climate change. What matters at this scale 
is not human intention but nonhuman agency (e.g., the warming of 
the planet). The usual aim of literary criticism, as construed by Clark, 
begins to look pointless. “In sum,” Clark writes, “at the third scale [the 
scale of climate change], a kind of non-anthropic irony deranges [lit-
erature] as any assimilable object of any given kind of moral/political 
reading.” 
 Clark proposes that critics shift the scale of their analysis and dem-
onstrates what this would look like by offering an analysis of Raymond 
Carver’s short story “Elephant” at three different scales. At an intimate, 
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personal scale, the story, one might suppose, is about individual domes-
tic heroism—a tale of a lower-middle-class man contriving to support 
an extended clan who persist in calling on him to give them money. 
Reading the story at a national scale, critics have suggested that it ex-
plores the protagonist’s temporary and compromised escape from the 
consumerism and materialism of United States culture in the late twen-
tieth century and argued that it protests against the economic disenfran-
chisement of the lower-middle class. At the third, global scale, the story 
illuminates the carbon footprint of the family as well as the family’s 
entrapment in a culture of dependence on consumption and fossil fuels 
that is wreaking havoc on the planet. Clark ends his essay by meditat-
ing on the relative merits of these three interpretations. He concludes 
that the third scale does not necessarily invalidate the others. Instead, he 
proposes that critics strive for “multiple, conflictual” interpretations on 
various scales.
Michael Tavel Clarke: Clark’s essay is provocative not only for the 
originality of its claims and methodology but also for its implications 
for postcolonial theory and other contemporary critical methods. The 
essay raises three primary questions for me: Does criticism engaged 
with ethical questions of equity across human populations (the stand-
ard postcolonial mode) necessarily undermine a global environmental 
consciousness and consideration of the nonhuman? Does the nationalist 
mode, with its support of sovereignty, national and cultural autonomy, 
and equity across nations that, at least until recently, dominated postco-
lonial criticism, necessarily represent an evasion of global responsibility 
magnified by recent environmental change? Would a turn to a global 
politics undermine still-valid arguments about the continuing need for 
equity across human populations, particularly as climate change exacer-
bates those inequities?
 Addressing just the first question, it strikes me that Clark may pose 
the dilemma too starkly. Equity- and rights-based criticism has value 
for thinking about the environment and the nonhuman, for example. 
This is particularly true when we recognize the environment and nonhu-
man species as Others; postcolonial and comparable political forms of 
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criticism have a great deal to say about the processes, consequences, and 
rectification of Othering. We need not necessarily abandon equity- and 
rights-based approaches but rather expand them to encompass the earth 
and its nonhuman occupants. Ecocritical approaches, in fact, often 
deploy existing methods for the study of human interaction with the 
environment.
 With regard to the second question—the conflict between national 
and global modes of criticism—it strikes me that the nationalist mode 
may still have some abiding value as well. Citing Dale Jamieson, Clark 
argues that “the founding conceptions of the liberal tradition [of politi-
cal governance] emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ‘in 
low-population-density and low-technology societies, with seemingly 
unlimited access to land and other resources.’” In a sense, postcolonial 
politics and criticism have long challenged this liberal tradition, a fact 
that becomes apparent when we note Clark’s description of the conse-
quences of this tradition: “Structurally committed to a process of con-
tinuous economic growth, modern Western society effectively projected 
as its material condition an ever-expandable frontier of new land or 
resources.” Since its inception, postcolonial scholarship has challenged 
the Western ideology of the ever-expandable frontier. While Clark and 
other critics have emphasized the border-eroding characteristics of cli-
mate change, and while critics today routinely highlight the problems 
that national borders create, there may be something to be said for the 
borders that postcolonial theory traditionally celebrated. Borders rep-
resent an ideological challenge to the ever-expandable frontier and its 
culture of continuous growth. Borders are thus symbols of the self-re-
straint, limitation, and containment that will be necessary if we are to 
reduce the global consumption of natural resources.
Faye Halpern: But Michael, I’m not entirely sure that national borders 
act as brakes to fossil fuel consumption in a context of global trade. And 
even if they do, they are certainly not acting as sufficient ones. Instead of 
further arguing this point, however, I want to pick up on your interest 
in thinking about the ramifications of this article for postcolonial theory 
and other kinds of literary criticism. To what extent does Clark’s call to 
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perform criticism according to a third or global scale change things? 
Conventional literary criticism, including postcolonial criticism, has not 
operated on this scale, with some exceptions; instead, as Clark makes 
clear, it has operated on the human scale, according to geographies and 
time frames that do not challenge our normal ways of apprehending 
the world. According to Clark, analyzing “Elephant” on this global 
scale makes certain things salient in the story that would otherwise go 
ignored: the existence of cars and the reproduction of humans—and 
that they’re American humans is not insignificant. If we imagine for a 
moment that Carver’s story world is just like our own world, each one 
of these American humans referenced in the story will use up more than 
his or her share of the earth’s resources (although thinking in terms of 
“his or her share” is one of the things that the exigent global warming 
leads us to question: perhaps, at this point, there are just no shares left) 
and contribute more than their share to carbon emissions. I’d like to 
pursue this question of what literary criticism would look like at this 
third scale when expanded from Carver’s short story to other literary 
works, as presumably Clark would like it to be.
 I wonder how different an analysis of “Elephant” would look from 
an analysis of Alexander Pope’s “The Rape of the Lock” (1712) or Indra 
Sinha’s Animal’s People (2007). (I’m deliberately taking very different 
works from very different periods and traditions.) My suspicion is: not 
very much. Wouldn’t literary criticism done on this scale produce a lot 
of very similar readings that all render visible artifacts of the industrial 
revolution (or glimmerings of it) and/or the existence of children? Close 
reading, the literary critic’s bread and butter, would be made unneces-
sary. I suspect literary criticism practiced at this scale would lose the 
specificity that makes different pieces of literary criticism interesting to 
at least the small number of people who read such things.
 But perhaps the fact that this third scale doesn’t produce particularly 
interesting readings if read in bulk is not a reason to reject it, especially 
if its interest inheres not in this third-scale reading in and of itself but in 
this reading’s juxtaposition with criticism done on more familiar scales. 
Clark cautions us not to pursue these third-scale readings to the exclu-
sion of more familiar kinds. “In sum,” Clark writes, “reading at several 
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scales at once cannot be just the abolition of one scale in the great claim 
of another but a way of enriching, singularizing and yet also creatively 
deranging the text.”
 However, I think that Clark’s article makes literary criticism as it is 
conventionally done, at the human scale, seem limited, not just in its 
ignorance of the scale suggested by climate change but on its own terms. 
Clark wants his portrait of “Elephant” and its criticism to act, in little, as 
a representation of all literary criticism. It’s not that I think scale effects 
apply to this miniature model, but I do think that he makes this story 
and its criticism seem more definitive than they actually are, as he does 
traditional literary criticism as a whole.1
 In fact, “Elephant” resists a definitive reading at this smaller scale; it 
breeds uncertainty. At the beginning of the story, the narrator’s impecu-
nious brother asks him for a loan and promises he’ll pay him back soon: 
“Trust me on this,” the brother says, “I won’t let you down” (38). “Trust 
me” becomes a refrain in the story, and its very syntax makes the reader 
distrust the person who utters it and hence distrust the narrator to the 
extent he does not share the reader’s skepticism. After reading the story, 
one might even entertain thoughts that the short story form might be, 
in Carver’s estimation, a sales pitch like the ones that characterize the 
narrator’s relatives. But Clark does not convey this uncertainty in his 
description of the story and the criticism of it at the first two scales.
 To illustrate what I mean, let me just pick up on a moment in Clark’s 
essay when he summarizes the plot of “Elephant,” which can be seen as 
a series of dupings of the narrator by his (perhaps) struggling relatives. 
According to Clark, the narrator’s brother, “requiring immediate help 
to pay the mortgage on his house, seems later to be able to forgo more 
borrowing because his wife might sell some land in her family.” Later, 
Clark refers to this sister-in-law as a “landowner.” But the story puts the 
existence of this land in question: the narrator’s family members appear 
willing to tell him anything to get him to cough up more money, and 
there seems no reason to believe any of their stories, even if the narrator 
himself sometimes chooses to do so. If this small plot point is in doubt, 
then so much more the ending of the story, which Clark, summing up 
literary criticism on it, characterizes as either “a wry anecdote of per-
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sonal heroism” or “a protest against social exclusion.” Yet it can just as 
easily be taken as the final scamming of a credulous man—and credu-
lous reader.
 So what does this uncertainty matter with reference to Clark’s call 
to change the way we do literary criticism? I think it indicates that we 
should take one of Clark’s points very seriously, perhaps more so than 
he does himself. Clark takes pains to say that the third scale should 
not count as the final word in literary interpretation; neither, he sug-
gests, should it remain deaf to what the first two scales can teach it: 
“An ecological overview is in danger of feeding a reductive but increas-
ingly familiar green moralism, keen to turn ecological facts into moral 
imperatives on how to live, blind to the sense of helplessness dominant 
in ‘Elephant’ at the first scale.” The narrator’s inability to change his 
situation—what I take Clark to mean by the narrator’s helplessness (his 
relatives dismiss his threats of moving to Australia as empty)—should 
cause us to question how effective any individual can be in halting cli-
mate change. But this point is one Clark makes thoughout the article, 
as when he gives examples of the “almost nonsenical rhetoric of envi-
ronmental slogans” like the one that asserts that “[a] motorist buying a 
slightly less destructive make of car is now ‘saving the planet.’” In other 
words, this point about helplessness does nothing but reaffirm Clark’s 
own sense of the way that climate change requires us to change the way 
we think about human agency.
 Yet I think the uncertainty that my smaller-scale reading unearths 
could inflect Clark’s third-scale reading with more force. Without the 
destabilizing force of uncertainty the story provides at a smaller scale of 
reading, I think his third reading does not escape being an “assimilable 
object of any given kind of moral/political reading” (Clark). I fear that 
Clark’s third-scale reading, protected from the uncertainty produced by 
the first two, becomes precisely that: an affirmation of the claims pre-
sented in Clark’s article, which enjoin us to think about and change our 
world to slow down global warming even as it resists reassuring us that 
any individual’s actions could alleviate it.
 I think, then, that attending to the uncertainty at the heart of 
“Elephant,” to how the story resists definitive interpretation, helps 
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strengthen Clark’s argument even as this uncertainty takes the argument 
to task for making interpretations of “Elephant” look more definitive 
than they are. This uncertain reading emphasizes the extent to which 
a large-scale reading cannot do without smaller-scale readings. That is, 
Clark’s article should function as an “and also” intervention in literary 
criticism rather than a replacement of it in favor of a call for literary crit-
ics to do more ethical things with their time, as the ending of his article 
seems to suggest.2
 Of course, “Elephant” is not the only literary text that unsettles our 
certainty in interpreting the world around us, although it may do so 
more explicitly than most. “Uncertainty” as a principle in literary criti-
cism: it’s hard to see this if we look at any particular article, which will 
almost always proceed with absolute certainty in regard to its own claim. 
Yet taken as a whole—at a larger scale—literary criticism has managed 
to challenge a number of commonsensical ideas that many people hold, 
and none has done this more so than the political criticism that Clark 
counsels us to see as inadvertently engaged in a strategy of containment. 
In emphasizing a reading of “Elephant” that excavates the uncertainty 
that runs throughout the story (even as I have proceeded with certainty 
in putting forth this reading), I hope to expose how literary criticism—
done at the smaller scales—is able to continue its work of unsettling 
habitual ways we see the world and paving the way for us to see the value 
in the disorienting and perhaps revolutionary scale of reading that Clark 
recommends. But this is true only if this third-scale mode of reading is 
thought of as an addition to what we already do rather than a replace-
ment of it. 
Michael: You offer a really nice reading of Carver’s “Elephant” in rela-
tion to Clark’s essay, and your discussion reassures me about one of the 
concerns I had regarding the ending of Clark’s argument. I agree with 
you that Clark’s article makes literary criticism as it is conventionally 
done, at the human scale, seem limited. I was disappointed by the end 
of his article, therefore, which seemed to retreat from its main claim. 
In concluding that the global scale of criticism does not necessarily in-
validate the smaller scales, it seemed to me that Clark was withdrawing 
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from his more controversial argument about the priority of the large 
scale analysis. You offer a good defense of the continuing value of the 
multiple scales of interpretation.
 I’d like to pick up on a minor comment you make about Clark’s 
essay—the idea that global warming requires us to change the way we 
think about human agency. This is a point that Dipesh Chakrabarty has 
also raised,3 and it involves a fundamental skepticism about traditional 
conceptions of human agency in an era in which individual contribu-
tions to climate change seem insignificant compared to the effects on 
the planet of humans as a species. It is also, I would argue, a skepticism 
that has been reinforced by the rise of multinational corporations that 
make individuals and even entire nations seem insignificant in terms 
of global governance. In this context, a focus on the individual or the 
nation (the small or medium scale) seems antiquated. Yet political activ-
ism continues to encourage individual changes in behavior, producing, 
in Clark’s estimation, “fantasies of agency.” Such “fantasies” suggest, for 
example, that an individual’s choice to buy a fuel-efficient car will “save 
the planet.” As Clark puts it, “[r]eceived concepts of agency, rationality, 
and responsibility are being strained or even begin to fall apart.” For 
Clark and others, the erosion of an individualist conception of human 
agency is tied to suspicions about the “value of ‘democracy’ as the most 
enlightened way to conduct human affairs” (Clark). Clark doesn’t ad-
dress the alternative, which would seem to be some form of totalitarian 
politics, yet he implicitly withdraws from the alternative by suggesting 
that diverse forms of literary criticism continue to have value and no 
single mode (the third scale) should take precedence over other modes. 
In other words, he ends up promoting a democratic, individualist free 
market of ideas despite the overall tack of his essay, which privileges 
global ecocriticism as the only viable model for contemporary literary 
studies, a model that is particularly valuable because it abandons a fixa-
tion on individual human agency.
 I find this interesting because Carver’s “Elephant” is similarly preoccu-
pied with questions of human agency. The narrator repeatedly expresses 
feelings of helplessness. While the story opens with his recognition that 
he “knew it was a mistake to let [his] brother have the money,” he never-
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theless feels he has no choice: “[W]hat could I do?” (Carver 38). His 
belief in his lack of agency takes the linguistic form of a repetitive use 
of the phrase “I had to”: “I had to keep shelling out” (38); “I had to 
keep on sending her money” (39); “I had to help her” (40); “I had to 
get a loan” (40); “I sent him the money. I had to. I felt I had to, at any 
rate—which amounts to the same thing” (38). As the last quotation sug-
gests, however, the story undercuts the narrator’s sense of his own absent 
agency, and it seems clear that his abdication of agency does him and 
his family little good. He does have choices, in part because his family 
members frequently manipulate and dupe him; he increasingly comes 
across as an enabler who, at least in some cases (such as his cocaine-
using son), facilitates reckless spending and poor decision-making by 
bankrolling his family. I can’t help but hear echoes of Reaganite hostility 
toward “welfare queens” here. The story, in fact, verges on a Republican 
critique of the welfare system—the idea that welfare is a bleeding-heart 
liberal program to support the lazy and impecunious, and the govern-
ment (or the narrator) would do better to encourage self-sufficiency 
through withdrawal of support (or tough love). In such a reading, the 
elephant of the title might refer to the Republican critique of massive 
government (it’s no accident that an elephant is also the symbol of the 
Republican Party). The story retreats somewhat from that hardline posi-
tion by acknowledging systemic forces that undermine self-sufficiency 
and restrict human agency. If we take him at his word, for example, 
the narrator’s brother, through no apparent fault of his own, was laid 
off with two hundred other employees and lost his health insurance. 
“[T]hings happen sometimes,” the narrator observes (38). “Just now . . . 
things were hard for everyone” (45).
 But acknowledgement of systemic forces that restrict human agency 
doesn’t completely evacuate the importance of the narrator’s individual 
choices, and one can hear elements of the narrator’s resignation and 
apathy even when he thinks about systemic forces: “[T]hings happen,” 
he says, as if mentally shrugging. The liberal retort to the Republican 
critique is that only systemic changes matter, and that in fact systemic 
forces provide a deceptive illusion of freedom and may actually restrict 
individuals to a limited set of choices that are ultimately damaging to the 
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environment and the self. Yet the liberal emphasis on systemic change 
can promote apathy on the individual level at a time when every con-
tribution makes a difference, even if small-scale differences are difficult 
to perceive from a global perspective. With regard to global warming, 
the value of small-scale efforts is magnified, given the current absence of 
a unified global effort tackling the problem of climate change. Equally 
troubling, an abandonment of individual agency reflects and promotes 
a global political system increasingly governed autocratically by institu-
tions of transnational capitalism. In other words, I think the abdication 
of human agency and the skepticism toward democracy are linked, both 
for Clark and other contemporary thinkers; both attitudes are symp-
toms of transnational capitalism rather than definitive arguments about 
human capabilities in the contemporary world. I don’t see why it’s nec-
essary to conclude, as Clark seems to do, that a higher-scale reading 
necessitates a rejection of human agency. Individual agency has always 
been limited by systemic forces (a fact that lower-scale readings have also 
acknowledged), but that doesn’t eradicate the existence or importance 
of individual agency. A focus on the global doesn’t override continued 
consideration of the local.
 If the narrator’s conviction about his lack of agency in Carver’s 
“Elephant” leads to a persistent use of the word “had” as a form of com-
pulsion (“I had to”) in the early parts of the story, his change of mind-
set near the end of the story leads him to re-deploy the word “have.” 
The narrator accepts the burden of his family dependents, gives up his 
own attachment to material possessions, and feels psychologically un-
burdened, at least temporarily; this is all signified by new uses of the 
word “have.” “I could skip having milk,” he says. “I didn’t have anything 
worth stealing. . . . There was nothing in the house I couldn’t live with-
out. I had the TV but I was sick of watching TV. . . . I had time to spare” 
(44). The narrator disavows his interest in having things, dismisses the 
value of the things he has, and embraces things that are free and uni-
versal (time). The word “have” changes, in other words, from a form of 
compulsion (arguably an effect of consumer capitalism, which insists on 
the necessity of having things) to a kind of Buddhist attitude of non-at-
tachment. In exercising the limited form of agency he feels he has access 
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to—the choice to give up attachments to material objects—the narrator 
ironically achieves the asceticism that will be necessary among the privi-
leged if the world is to overcome global warming. This is what I meant 
earlier when I said that borders are important symbols of limits and 
restraints—on materialism, on consumption, on waste, and so forth. 
Such symbols are significant on all scales, both the individual and the 
systemic.
 If this sounds like the “green moralism” to which Clark objects, I 
would reply that one might ask whether Clark’s own third-scale liter-
ary criticism transcends individualist green politics. What value does a 
global, ecocritical perspective have if not to train us in a transnational, 
environmental way of thinking as a means of preparing us for the mind-
set that will be necessary for political and social change to combat global 
warming? As you put it, Faye, “Clark’s article . . . enjoin[s] us to think 
about and change our world to slow down global warming even as it re-
sists reassuring us that any individual’s actions could alleviate it.” I’m not 
convinced that Clark’s third-scale reading evacuates politics or moralism 
any more than it evacuates human agency. Individualist human agency, 
in fact, is a prerequisite for any form of literary study that purports to 
offer an original analysis of a text—which is to say, it is a prerequisite 
for all literary criticism—and Clark’s third-scale reading of Carver is 
no exception. It is not, as Clark suggests, that the third-scale reading 
“deranges the short story as any easily assimilable object of . . . moral/
political reading”; rather, it is Clark’s insistence on the absence of human 
agency that deranges the functions of literary criticism—an insistence 
contradicted by his own essay.
 Carver’s “Elephant” exposes its narrator’s abdication of agency as an 
unproductive form of apathy and a possible effect of consumer capital-
ism. In exposing its narrator in this way, the story invites renewed at-
tention to the possibilities of individual agency even as it acknowledges 
systemic limits constraining that agency. I’m wary of Clark’s abdica-
tion of human agency because I’m concerned that it may promote an 
equally unproductive form of apathy and acquiescence to the current 
global governance by massive economic institutions that is undermin-
ing our faith in the possibility of democratic governance. A continued 
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recognition of individual agency and its limits might have benefits for 
Clark’s third-scale ecocriticism, the planet as a whole, and a rejuve-
nated democracy in a climate increasingly skeptical of political change 
from below.
Faye: Yes, I agree you can interpret the story to suppose that it is con-
demning apathy—and making a distinction between that and Buddhist 
non-attachment. We’ve managed to pull many plausible interpretations 
from the story. This might be a problem: I suspect that we—you, me, 
Clark—can ingeniously find the kind of interpretations of “Elephant” 
to support whatever points we’re trying to make (and can also find 
evidence to undermine each other’s interpretations). And even if our 
interpretations of uncertainty or human agency in “Elephant” are unim-
peachable, it’s still not clear how we should apply them to the problem 
of climate change.
 In terms of my own reading, “Elephant” thematizes uncertainty—of 
that I’m pretty certain—but does it endorse it as a healthful attitude to 
take toward the world or condemn it as uncharitable? And even if we 
could decide how the story evaluates uncertainty, why should that at-
titude necessarily help us think about climate change? Yet I proceeded 
as if it would—or at least as if it would provide enough evidence to help 
us think more deeply about Clark’s article.
 This finessing might be exactly what Clark is hoping to avoid with 
his desire to offer a reading that prevents this story from becoming an 
“assimilable object of any given kind of moral/political reading.” Yet 
our conversation has made me doubt whether it’s possible to avoid 
it. The ingeniousness of literary critics, combined with the multiplic-
ity of interpretative possibilities that an interesting work of literature 
offers, is a real problem if we look to these works to guide us in our 
thinking about climate change. Yes, our ingenious readings can add 
authority to our claims about climate change and its relationship 
to literary criticism, but can they lead us to think of something we 
weren’t already inclined to think? That kind of discomfort—adopting 
a way of thinking that undermines many of the values and beliefs we 
hold—might be something that’s required to combat climate change, 
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and I’m not certain we’re capable, in our guise as literary critics, of 
embracing it.
 I realize that I might seem to be contradicting myself here: in my 
earlier response I described how literary critics have presented us with 
usefully counterintuitive ideas about the world, but here I’m doubting 
the efficacy of literary texts to guide our thinking on an issue like climate 
change. Clark’s article might be proof of both observations: it gener-
ates importantly counterintuitive ideas about the flaws in our think-
ing about climate change, but I’m not convinced that he needed to use 
“Elephant” to get to them. For all of us, I suspect “Elephant” played the 
role of heuristic more than incubator. But perhaps Clark can comment 
on whether he agrees that the multiplicity of interpretive possibilities in 
a story like “Elephant” presents a problem for using it to think about 
climate change. 
Timothy Clark: I’m delighted that my essay has sparked this intelligent 
interest, and it’s great to have been given this chance to join the discus-
sion. It will be more interesting if I use this space to think more about 
the arguments rather than spend too much time defending the exact 
letter of my essay.
 I’d most like to take up the understanding in your discussion that the 
reading of Carver at the large, six-hundred-year scale entails “a rejection 
of human agency,” or that the argument about this scale involves an “ab-
dication of human agency” and that “it is [my] insistence on the absence 
of human agency that deranges the functions of literary criticism” rather 
than any view enforced by the expanded spatial and temporal scale.
 I think the issues are rather more complex than this. I’d like to go 
back to the central theme of “scale effects.” The editorial summary of the 
essay suggests that scale effects occur “when physical and social struc-
tures that might work on a smaller scale fail to work on a larger one: 
a model of a wooden bridge rebuilt as a full-sized bridge, for example, 
might fail to support the necessary weight.” This is a good example, but 
my essay also refers briefly to the now widely used notion of a “carbon 
footprint.” This useful concept relates to the issue of an individual’s 
environmental impact on the atmosphere or, crudely speaking, the at-
15
Ed i to r s’  No t e s
mospheric pollution for which he or she could notionally be held re-
sponsible. However—and this is where scale effects come in—the size of 
anyone’s carbon footprint could be of no interest or significance in itself. 
After all, if it were just a matter of my own emissions the very concept 
of a carbon footprint would be otiose. The carbon footprint of my life, 
or any source, matters in relation to scale effects—that is, the uncertain 
effect of there being so many billions of other footprints over an uncer-
tain timescale, including multiple, often badly understood human and 
nonhuman factors each with uncertain thresholds of impact (such as 
population dynamics, economic growth, the way tundra decays, or the 
reflectivity of clouds). Scale effects are something beyond my individual 
horizon, perception, or even calculation. The effect of my individual 
action in relation to my carbon footprint is caught up in this series in 
which each impact is of significance only through its opaque relation 
to the others, now and in the future. So I do not see scale effects as 
reducing individual human agency to nothing but instead as introduc-
ing a perplexing blend of intellectual uncertainty and moral urgency, as 
taking equations of moral and political accounting and, if I can quote 
an early part of the essay, dropping into them “both a zero and an infin-
ity: [for] the greater the number of people engaged in modern forms of 
consumption then the less the relative influence or responsibility of each 
but the worse the cumulative impact of their insignificance” (Clark).
 Michael writes: 
I don’t see why it’s necessary to conclude, as Clark seems to do, 
that a higher scale reading necessitates a rejection of human 
agency. Individual agency has always been limited by systemic 
forces (a fact that lower scale readings have also acknowledged), 
but that doesn’t eradicate the existence or importance of indi-
vidual agency. A focus on the global doesn’t override continued 
consideration of the local.
The original essay was not meant to deny the existence of human 
agency, even at the individual level. My aim was to highlight the 
alarming factors that reduce human agency’s possible impact to an un-
knowable and miniscule level while simultaneously implicating it (and 
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normal life in a modern context such as Carver’s) in environmentally 
destructive decisions of acquiescence usually not even recognised as 
such. In this case there is the cruel irony of acts of personal generosity 
at the individual scale being implicated, however minutely and uncer-
tainly, in the support of modes of life that ultimately entail depriva-
tion and violence on the larger one. Michael writes usefully that the 
virtue or purpose of the third-scale reading could only be to influence 
the possible choices for human agency in “preparing us for the mindset 
that will be necessary for political and social change.” I think this last 
implication is clearly right, but that any emergent mindset is also now 
caught up in a syndrome that Richard Kerridge has well described: we 
are becoming more and more aware of the work of nonhuman players 
in environmental change and of the limits of individual human agency, 
precisely at a time when human action seems more and more urgent 
(367). My essay attempted to map out this condition of entrapment in 
Carver’s comic monologue.
 Faye and Michael’s sense that the essay gives too circumscribed a view 
of human agency suggests to me that I should have distinguished more 
clearly between two aspects of the view from a hypothetical and ex-
tremely damaged future. The first aspect is Carver’s US citizens’ aware-
ness of inhabiting what William Ophuls describes as a condition of 
“energy slavery.” The provocative phrase helps stress how much char-
acters like Carver’s speaker inhabit an infrastructure and economy in 
which their choices are not only very constrained but in which most 
of them, unwittingly or not, have a cumulative and negative environ-
mental impact, and where even what passes as “normal life,” along with 
the psychic conditioning of ideologies such as consumerism and liberal 
individualism, inhabit the space of possibility created temporarily by 
fossil fuel use. If this is accepted then there may also be difficult mate-
rial pressures on the seemingly straightforward moral/political argument 
that arises out of current inequities, i.e., not abandoning equity- and 
rights-based approaches but rather seeking to “expand them to encom-
pass the earth and its nonhuman occupants,” as Michael suggests. Might 
the term “expand” be potentially misleading here, suggesting as it does 
a limitless or at least unconsidered reserve of resources? The larger scale 
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reading can perhaps be provocative by making it more difficult for a 
Western critic to argue for an expansion of the rights and conditions 
that he or she already probably enjoys, rather than thinking that, for 
example, his or her being a motorist is already morally problematic.
 The second aspect of the larger-scale view is that, in the hypothet-
ical late twenty-third century, it will be the real, physical impacts of 
now-living people that will be felt, regardless of those people’s attitudes, 
voting habits, or intentions when alive. This long-scale, ecological per-
spective, concerning matters of energy and waste, does not deny in-
dividual human agency but simply discounts questions of personhood 
or past intention in the first place. At this scale the psychological or 
interpersonal uncertainties suggested for rereading the text at the lower 
scales are necessarily irrelevant: it would not matter if the speaker were 
being duped by his relatives or not, or whether the narrator is learning 
to give up his own material possessions while still bankrolling the life-
styles of the others. The retrospective scenario that emerges is still one 
of his entrapment on the game board of physical scale effects he does 
not see. So I want to qualify the editorial summary’s assertion that “[w]
hat matters at this [largest] scale is not human intention but nonhu-
man agency.” It is rather that individual human agency registers on the 
same level as nonhuman agency, i.e., in terms of its physical effects, even 
while the totality of human actions have become a new, quasi-geological 
entity that produces obscure and unintended and unplanned impacts, 
while human agency en masse is as obscure and implacable as nonhuman 
agency. To express this, I used the gothic imagery of a malign, parallel 
“zombie” universe in which the characters, caught up in their personal 
dramas, are doubled by themselves as merely physical entities. This im-
agery was meant to express the disjunction between our normal scales 
and forms of consideration and this purely material one.4
 To turn to a related issue in the editors’ response, Michael writes that 
“[i]n concluding that the global scale of criticism does not necessar-
ily invalidate the smaller scales, it seemed to me that Clark was with-
drawing from his more controversial argument about the priority of 
the large-scale analysis.” Yet it also seemed extremely important not to 
argue that the demands of the third scale could or should automati-
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cally be converted into personal and national imperatives to be realized 
at once (i.e., leading surely to kinds of eco-fascism), but to also try to 
keep open, in tension with each other, the individual and group-scale 
viewpoints of earlier scales. If this sounds evasive, it anticipates a world 
in which, because current modes of life are already unsustainable, the 
future becomes the scene of a continuous and, ideally, very informed 
casuistry, with every significant decision requiring us to weigh current, 
specific individual or group interests against costs to others—human 
and nonhuman—not just in the present but in an extrapolated future. 
The reading on several scales is a way of mapping the contours of the 
dilemma. We now live in a time in which we know that we cannot not 
consider things on this third scale, even if we have no adequate inherited 
means of doing so and it produces conflicting values and priorities.
 Michael asks if “criticism engaged with ethical questions of equity 
across human populations (the standard postcolonial mode) necessarily 
undermine[s] a global environmental consciousness and consideration 
of the nonhuman.” I’d like to be able to answer “no.” My concern was 
with pseudo-progressive liberal arguments, often couched in terms of 
social inclusion, for which the issues were matters of respect and equita-
ble distribution of resources within the borders of a given nation-state. In 
the American context at issue, for example, what might look like mate-
rial equity between people considered only at the national scale—say 
in terms of the universalization of car-ownership and use—could never 
be transferrable to the whole population of the earth without massive 
environmental destruction. The daily suburban normality is ultimately 
a complex form of theft. As Robert Savino Oventile remarks, in an ex-
clusively US context a politicised criticism at this social-cultural scale 
remains tied to narratives of inclusion and “recognition of the other” 
that also function as the soft face of an expanding US capitalism, for 
they are based on norms of prosperous, national inclusion structurally 
in denial of their parasitism on the rest of the world: “Tied to narratives 
of progress, these critical programs rely on visions of a future that, on 
inspection, project versions of the present, only cleansed of the contra-
dictions and impasses making the present possible” (328). So ecological 
arguments about the unsustainable violence of “developed” modes of 
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life render even this account of life in US suburbia already a kind of 
“postcolonial” reading.
 Thus the issue in reading “Elephant” like this becomes a kind of ma-
terial/environmental unconsciousness. The narrator has no awareness 
of the fact that his acts of self-sacrifice and generosity are caught in 
broader economic and infrastructural systems that, on the planetary 
scale, are unsustainable, or that, in maintaining the separate households 
of his relatives in a social context in which these kinds of small separate 
households with individual luxuries such as cars are taken simply as a 
respectable norm, he is also reducing the options for future generations 
of human and nonhuman lives. This may seem like an incongruous 
juxtaposition of concerns—personal generosity in an ordinary suburb 
is said to enable or disregard severe ecological damage—and it certainly 
matches the sense of impropriety and even absurdity that many people 
feel when confronted with green politics and its seemingly intrusive 
moral constraints. Yet this is what the thinking on the larger scale uncov-
ers. This also corresponds, I think, with kinds of psychic discomposure 
currently felt by increasing numbers of people as they become environ-
mentally aware. Consciousness of the way even one’s most trivial actions 
may be caught up in vast ramifications produces kinds of psychic dis-
order, a mixture of a contradictory sense of powerlessness, horror, and 
responsibility that will also seem necessarily “out of proportion” or “over 
the top” because older norms of proportionality have become anachro-
nistic and one is subject to compelling moral claims that are increasingly 
at odds with each other.
 Faye asked a question that has bothered me a lot in the past few years: 
“I wonder how different an analysis of ‘Elephant’ would look from an 
analysis of Alexander Pope’s ‘The Rape of the Lock’ (1712) or Indra 
Sinha’s Animal’s People (2007). . . . My suspicion is this: not very much.” 
I think this is where the point about reading on all three scales, not just 
the planetary one, seems important, with the largest scale not eclipsing 
the specificity of the lower ones (for instance the humour in “Elephant,” 
questions of style, or the possible alternative readings of character and 
motive) but becoming an increasingly unignorable source of awkward 
questions for more mainstream criticism. What seems set to be devel-
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oped, spurred by the demands to think on the scale required by the issues 
of climate change, would be a new offshoot of postcolonial criticism in 
which future generations, nonhuman as well as human, are regarded as 
a significant moral focus and enforce new or revised evaluations of the 
literary heritage. Such readings work back from the growing likelihood 
of environmental disaster to consider ways in which modes of action 
and thought at issue in an object text may or may not be implicated in 
that future. This is “catachronism” (Srinivas Aravamudan’s neologism, 
which plays on “anachronism”) or “backcasting”—the rereading of a 
contemporary or past text in relation to a re-characterization of “the past 
and the present in terms of a future proclaimed as determined but that 
is of course not yet fully realized” (Aravamudan 8). Taking up, just off 
the cuff, the two texts Faye mentioned, such backcasting would touch 
on the nascent imperialist culture of luxury commodification in Pope’s 
poem (suggesting a fairly standard postcolonial reading, perhaps, but 
with an intensified sense of the stakes), while Sinha’s Animal’s People, 
as a contemporary text, could be far more directly related to postco-
lonial environmental politics, with such evident foci as environmental 
disaster, international capitalism and its evasions of responsibility, and 
the human/animal difference. That interpretation seems at least morally 
straightforward, but if we read “catachronically,” more perplexing issues 
may also arise: How would it be, for instance, to supplement given read-
ings of Animal’s People by rereading the novel as a kind of temporal al-
legory, with the Indian victims of the industrial disaster depicted in the 
book (based on the explosion of a US-owned chemical plant at Bhopal 
but altered by Sinha in name and character to give it a more general sig-
nificance) also understood as prefiguring future people anywhere? These 
would be people helplessly removed in time, not geographical distance, 
from the perpetrators of the harm, and struggling to define what they 
have become.
 I would be worried if, adapting the words of Michael’s further query, 
“a turn to a global politics [were seen to] undermine still-valid argu-
ments about the continuing need for equity across human populations, 
particularly as climate change exacerbates those inequities.” Rather, the 
turn to global politics, especially over an expanded time scale, would un-
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derline the injustice of these current inequities and also include within 
them future human and nonhuman generations. The difficulty with 
thinking on the third scale, however, could be that, in a finite world 
rapidly being exhausted, recognising the rights of future generations of 
lives, human or otherwise, is in tension with the evident claims of the 
current human population, many of whom must demand a fairer and 
increased share of current resources. The not-yet-born, then, become a 
new kind of social victim.5
Notes
 1 Clark seems to equate all literary criticism with political criticism and its urge 
to use literary texts as occasions to think about rights-based subjects and more 
equitable social arrangements. This is the kind of criticism this third scale of 
criticism so unsettles. However, I’ve been thinking about narratological criti-
cism, which has, at least in many cases, a different aim than political criticism. 
What is accomplished by Clark’s subsuming all criticism into political criti-
cism? 
 2 The article ends: “This [a point about how climate change might cause literary 
critics to venture into areas outside their expertise] would also suggest that the 
humanities as currently constituted make up forms of ideological containment 
that now need to change.” 
 3 See Chakrabarty’s “The Climate of History: Four Theses” and “Postcolonial 
Studies and the Challenge of Climate Change.”
 4 The salient extract from the essay is: 
  Characters as ‘persons’ and responsible agents are now doubled by them-
selves as mere physical entities. The larger the scale the more thing-like 
becomes the significance of the person registered on it (even as scale ef-
fects have given human beings the status of a geological force). Plots, 
characters, setting and trivia that seemed normal and harmless on the 
personal or national scale reappear as destructive doubles of themselves 
on the third scale, part of a disturbing and encroaching parallel universe, 
whose malign reality it is becoming impossible to deny. (Clark)
 5 The material on Carver in the essay has since been significantly reworked as 
part of a book, Ecocriticism on the Edge: The Anthropocene as a Threshold Concept 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2015). This reworking takes some issues further, but the 
current response confines itself to the original version of the essay in Telemor-
phosis.
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